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THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT-THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DETERMINES THAT ONLY A MATERIAL
FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT AN
INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PROGRAM
VIOLATES THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Elexis Reed*
RIOR to 1975, Congress found that the educational needs of mil-
lions of children with disabilities were not being fully met.' In re-
sponse, Congress created what is now called the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") "to ensure that all children with
disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment,
and independent living. ' '2 One of the most significant mechanisms for
achieving the goals of the IDEA is the creation and implementation of an
individualized education program ("IEP") for each disabled child.3 The
United States Supreme Court has articulated the standard for assessing
an IEP's content. 4 However, only the Fifth Circuit and the Eight Circuit
have addressed the standard for assessing an IEP's implementation. 5 The
Ninth Circuit dealt with this issue for the first time in Van Duyn v. Baker
* J.D. Candidate 2009, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.S., 2006 Texas A&M Uni-
versity. Special thanks to Chris and my family for all their love and support. Also, many
thanks to my Aunt Kelly and Uncle Bob, and their special needs daughter, my cousin,
Elizabeth. Elizabeth-your indomitable spirit and perserverance amaze me, and this case-
note is dedicated to you.
1. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2000).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2000); see also Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502
F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2007).
4. See generally Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester
County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982) (holding that a state meets its obligation to
provide handicapped children with a free appropriate education by "providing personal-
ized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally
from that instruction").
5. See Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000); Ne-
osho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).
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School District 5J, holding that only a material failure to implement an
IEP violates the IDEA.6 The Ninth Circuit's holding was in error be-
cause it contradicted the IDEA and its goals. The court should have
found, as the dissent did, that failure to implement any portion of an IEP
violates the IDEA.
During the 2001-2002 school year, Van Duyn was a thirteen-year-old
mentally disabled child who had a severe case of autism and required an
IEP.7 As such, "[o]n February 22, 2001, a team comprised of teachers,
district representatives and Van Duyn's mother finalized a comprehen-
sive IEP for the 2001-02 school year."'8 The IEP required Van Duyn to
work on reading and writing for six to seven hours per week, mathematics
for eight to ten hours per week, and physical education for three to four
hours per week.9 Additionally, it incorporated a behavioral plan. 10 Fur-
thermore, the IEP required that Van Duyn be placed in a self-contained
classroom and that all materials be presented at his level.11 It also re-
quired a regional autism specialist to visit the school twice per week,
"augmentative communication" services for two hours per month, and his
aide to receive autism training. 12 Finally, the IEP mandated that the
school give quarterly report cards marking Van Duyn's progress and en-
suring that all short-term objectives were being pursued.1 3
Van Duyn alleged that Baker School District 5J (the "District") failed
to implement key portions of his IEP during the 2001-2002 school year,
which included, among other things, that the district "fail[ed] to train [his]
teachers and aide; fail[ed] to provide required placement in a self-con-
tained classroom; fail[ed] to provide adequate 'direct teacher engage-
ment' with [Van Duyn]; fail[ed] to work on several of [his] academic IEP
goals throughout the day; and fail[ed] to follow the IEP-designated be-
havior plan."'1 4 Van Duyn alleged that this failure to implement his IEP
violated the IDEA by depriving him of a free appropriate public educa-
tion ("FAPE") guaranteed by the IDEA. 15
Van Duyn's parents requested a due process hearing pursuant to 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f).16 An administrative law judge ("AL") concluded that
because Van Duyn was not being given the required eight to ten hours of
mathematics per week, the District had failed to implement the IEP in
that respect. 17 However, the ALJ ruled in favor of the District in every
6. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822.




11. Id. at 816.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, No. 02-1060-MO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44883,
at *18 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2005).
15. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 814-15.
16. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (Supp. 2004); Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 816.
17. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 816-17.
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other contested area.18 More specifically, the AU "found that Van
Duyn's aide and teachers had been properly trained, that he had been
placed in a self-contained classroom, that his teachers had worked with
him on oral language skills, that he had received daily instruction in read-
ing and that short-term objectives ... had not initially been implemented
but were now being followed." 19
Following the ALJ's decision, Van Duyn appealed to the district
court. 20 The district court found that the District did not fail to imple-
ment a substantial portion of Van Duyn's IEP, and that the District had
obeyed the ALJ's direction to provide additional math instruction to Van
Duyn.21 Van Duyn then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which held that
only a "material failure to implement an IEP violates the IDEA. 22
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of how much leeway the IDEA
allows a district in implementing an IEP.23 The Ninth Circuit looked to
both the text of the IDEA and decisions of other courts to determine the
standard for assessing an IEP's implementation. 24 The court held that
when the "school district does not perform exactly as called for by the
IEP, the district does not violate the IDEA unless it is shown to have
materially failed to implement the child's IEP. ''25 In particular, the court
found that "[a] material failure occurs when there is more than a minor
discrepancy between the services provided to a disabled child and those
required by the IEP. ' '26 In Van Duyn's case, the Ninth Circuit held that
the District had not materially failed to implement his IEP and thus had
not violated the IDEA.27
To determine the standard for assessing an IEP's implementation, the
court looked to the text of the IDEA, which defines a free appropriate
public education as "special education and related services that ... are
provided in conformity with the [child's] individualized education pro-
gram."'28 The court read "in conformity with" the IEP as counseling
"against making minor implementation failures actionable."29 After re-
viewing the text of the IDEA, the Ninth Circuit concluded the statute did
not require perfect adherence to an IEP, nor did it require a court to find
that minor implementation failures were a denial of a free appropriate
education.30 Additionally, the court looked to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District,
18. Id.
19. Id. at 817.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 822.
23. Id. at 815.
24. Id. at 821.
25. Id. at 815.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 826.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (Supp. 2004); Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821.




Westchester County v. Rowley regarding the standard for assessing the
content of an IEP to help determine the standard to be used for assessing
an IEP's implementation. 3' The Supreme Court described the IDEA's
purpose as providing a "basic floor of opportunity" rather than a "poten-
tial-maximizing education" which supported granting some flexibility to
the district responsible for implementing the IEPs.32 Furthermore, the
court looked to the Fifth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, the only two
circuits to have explicitly addressed IEP implementation failures, and
found that both circuits had addressed the IEP implementation failures
consistently with their reading of the text of the IDEA and Rowley.33
Applying the "materiality" standard, the court only focused on what it
understood to be Van Duyn's weightiest claims: (1) insufficient math in-
struction, (2) not implementing Van Duyn's behavior management plan,
(3) not presenting work at Van Duyn's level; and (4) not placing Van
Duyn in a self-contained classroom.3 4 With respect to all of Van Duyn's
claims, the court held that none of them constituted a material failure to
implement his IEP, thus the District had not violated the IDEA.35
In contrast, the dissent concluded that the District failed to fully imple-
ment the IEP, thus violating the IDEA, because failure to implement any
portion of an IEP violates the IDEA.36 The dissent argued that the "ma-
teriality" standard set forth by the majority to address implementation
failures was "inconsistent with the text of the... IDEA..., inappropriate
for the judiciary, and unworkably vague."'37
Indeed, the majority established the incorrect standard for assessing an
IEP's implementation. The dissent correctly identified the flaws in the
majority's "materiality" standard and applied the proper standard for as-
sessing the implementation of IEPs-failure to implement any portion of
an IEP violates the IDEA.38 As the dissent correctly pointed out, "a
school district's failure to comply with ... an IEP to which it has assented
31. Id.
32. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21, 201 (1982); Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821.
33. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821-22. The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of IEP imple-
mentation failure in Houston Independent School District v. Bobby R., holding that "to
prevail on a claim under the IDEA, a party challenging the implementation of an IEP must
show more than a de minimis failure to implement all the elements of that IEP, and, in-
stead, must demonstrate that the school board or other authorities failed to implement
substantial or significant provisions of the IEP." 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000). The
Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of IEP implementation failure in Neosho R-V School
District v. Clark, holding that the IDEA is violated "if there is evidence that the school
actually failed to implement an essential element of the IEP that was necessary for the
child to receive an educational benefit." 315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).
34. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 823.
35. See id. at 825.
36. Id. at 829 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 826. For example, as the dissent pointed out, "if an IEP require[d] ten hours
per week of math tutoring, would the provision of only nine hours be 'more than a minor
discrepancy'? Eight hours?" Id.
38. See id. at 829.
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Casenote
is... a denial of FAPE, and, hence, a violation of the IDEA. ' 39 The text
of the IDEA states that free appropriate education means "special educa-
tion and related services that . . . are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program. '40 The majority's finding that "in con-
formity with" somehow "counsels against making minor implementation
failures actionable" is unsupported by the text of the IDEA and incorrect
based on the plain meaning of the word "conformity. ' 41 After all, "in
conformity with" does not suggest flexibility as the majority advocates,
but rather its definition connotes strict compliance. Therefore, failure to
implement any portion of an IEP is not "in conformity with" the IEP as
required by the statutory text, thus making it a denial of FAPE and re-
sulting in a violation of the IDEA.
Additionally, the majority inappropriately found that the Supreme
Court's approach in Rowley was informative in regards to the implemen-
tation of an IEP.42 The majority argued that the Supreme Court's
description in Rowley of the IDEA's purpose supported granting "flexi-
bility to school districts charged with implementing IEPs"; however, it
failed to address the underlying tension occurring in Rowley regarding
this purpose of the IDEA.43 The majority in Rowley found that the stan-
dard for assessing IEP content is that the content of the IEP confer
"some" educational benefit upon the disabled child.44 The fact that the
majority in Rowley found such a low standard in assessing IEP content,
only requiring that it confer "some" benefit, does not imply "flexibility"
as the majority suggests, but rather advocates the need for a stricter and
more stringent standard for IEP implementation to uphold IDEA's pur-
pose of providing children with disabilities an education that meets their
needs and prepares them for the future. 45 Allowing the flexibility that
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit suggest regarding IEP content
and implementation only undermines the very reason Congress created
the IDEA-the educational needs of millions of children with disabilities
were not being fully met. Also, granting this flexibility will further dimin-
ish the only educational rights disabled children have-the rights granted
to them by the IDEA.46
39. Id. at 827.
40. Id. at 827 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2000)).
41. Id. at 821. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines "conformity" as "correspon-
dence in form, manner, or character" or "agreement." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DIcTIONARY 262 (11th ed. 2004).
42. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821.
43. See id.; compare Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester
County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (6-3 decision) (arguing that Congress only
intended the IDEA to provide handicapped children "access" to FAPE), with id. at 215
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress intended the IDEA to identify and evaluate
handicapped children and provide them with "an equal opportunity to learn").
44. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
45. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2000).
46. In Rowley, the Supreme Court first diminished the educational rights of disabled
children by finding that the purpose of the IDEA was to allow handicapped children "ac-
cess" to FAPE, not to "maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate
with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children." See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.
2008]
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Furthermore, as the dissent correctly points out, instead of worrying
about how material a failure is, one should assume that an IEP Team 47
settled on a specific educational service for a reason, especially because
each specific educational service is designed by the IEP team for a spe-
cific disabled child for the purpose of providing that child with a free
appropriate public education.48 After all, "[i]f the IEP Team had thought
that another, lesser service would be sufficient to provide FAPE, it would
have included that service in the IEP" instead.49 Enabling school districts
to disregard portions of the IEP which the IEP Team has already agreed
upon would essentially give them a license to single handedly change the
content of the IEP, which disregards both the IEP and the parental par-
ticipation provisions of the IDEA.50 Furthermore, a substantial amount
of work goes into deciding an IEP, and holding that a school district does
not have to follow it could undermine both the work put into creating
the IEP and the disabled child's education. Also, as the dissent argues,
the judiciary is not in the position to determine whether IEP implementa-
tion failures are material because they do not know the disabled child,
and they know that the IEP team included measures that it thought was
important enough to be incorporated into the IEP.51 Finally, even if the
majority's "materiality" standard is applied, because the IEP team de-
signs the IEP to provide a specific student with FAPE any subsequent
deviation from the IEP is necessarily material and, thus, a violation of the
IDEA.52
In Van Duyn v. Baker School District 5J, the Ninth Circuit determined
the incorrect standard for assessing the implementation of an IEP and
erred in holding that only a material failure to implement an IEP violates
the IDEA. In reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit mistakenly extended
the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley regarding the standard for IEP
content to the area of IEP implementation and misinterpreted the text of
the IDEA. In finding that the standard for assessing IEP implementation
is one of "materiality," the Ninth Circuit undermined the purpose and
goals of the IDEA and further diminished the educational rights of dis-
abled children. Instead, the Ninth Circuit should have found, as the dis-
sent did, that failure to implement any portion of an IEP violates the
IDEA.
Next, the Supreme Court diminished the educational rights of disabled children by holding
that the standard for assessing IEP content is only that "some" education benefit is con-
ferred upon the disabled child. See id.
47. An IEP Team is a group of individuals composed of the disabled child, the dis-
abled child's parents, at least one regular education teacher (if mainstream participation is
contemplated), at least one special education teacher, a specially qualified representative
of the school district, an individual who can interpret the instructional implications of eval-
uation results, and other individuals with expertise regarding the child's needs and disabil-
ity. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2000).
48. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827-28 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 828.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 829.
52. Id. at 828.
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